Stationary Markov equilibria for K-class discounted stochastic games by Page, Frank
		
Stationary Markov 
Equilibria for K-
Class Discounted 
Stochastic Games 
Frank Page 
SRC Discussion Paper No 44 
September 2015 
	
ISSN 2054-538X 
Abstract  
For a discounted stochastic game with an uncountable state space and compact metric 
action spaces, we show that if the measurable-selection-valued, Nash payoff selection 
correspondence of the underlying one-shot game contains a sub-correspondence 
having the K-limit property (i.e., if the Nash payoff selection sub-correspondence 
contains its K-limits and therefore is a K correspondence), then the discounted 
stochastic game has a stationary Markov equilibrium. Our key result is a new fixed 
point theorem for measurable-selection-valued correspondences having the K-limit 
property. We also show that if the discounted stochastic game is noisy (Duggan, 2012), 
or if the underlying probability space satisfies the G-nonatomic condition of Rokhlin 
(1949) and Dynkin and Evstigneev (1976) (and therefore satisfies the coaser transition 
kernel condition of He and Sun, 2014), then the Nash payoff selection correspondence 
contains a sub-correspondence having the K-limit property.  
 
Keywords: approximate Caratheodory selections, fixed points of nonconvex valued 
correspondences, measurable selection valued correspondences, Komlos limits, 
Komlos’ Theorem, weak star convergence, discounted stochastic games, stationary 
Markov equilibria. 
 
JEL Classification: C7 
 
 
This paper is published as part of the Systemic Risk Centre’s Discussion Paper Series. 
The support of the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) in funding the SRC 
is gratefully acknowledged [grant number ES/K002309/1]. 
 
Frank Page, Professor, Indiana University Bloomington and Research Associate, 
Systemic Risk Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
 
Published by 
Systemic Risk Centre 
The London School of Economics and Political Science 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE 
 
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval 
system or transmitted in any form or by any means without the prior permission in 
writing of the publisher nor be issued to the public or circulated in any form other than 
that in which it is published. 
 
Requests for permission to reproduce any article or part of the Working Paper should 
be sent to the editor at the above address. 
 
© Frank Page, submitted 2015 
Stationary Markov Equilibria for ?-Class Discounted
Stochastic Games
Frank Page1
Indiana University
Bloomington, IN 47405
USA
fpage.supernetworks@gmail.com
July 3, 2014
current version: September 2, 20152
1Research Associate, Systemic Risk Centre, London School of Economics, London WC2A 2AE
2The paper was completed during two memorable visits to the Systemic Risk Centre at LSE
in July of 2014 and June-July of 2015. The author is grateful to J. P. Zigrand, Jon Danielsson,
and Ann Law of the SRC for all their support and hospitality. The author is also very grateful
to J. P. Zigrand, Jon Danielsson, Heinrich von Weizsäcker, and Ondrej Kalenda for many helpful
discussions during the writing of this paper. Finally, the author acknowledges ?nancial support
from the Systemic Risk Centre (under ESRC grant number ES/K002309/1). Stationary Markov
Equilibria for K-Class DSGs_2_September 2, 2015.
Abstract
For a discounted stochastic game with an uncountable state space and compact metric
action spaces, we show that if the measurable-selection-valued, Nash payo? selection cor-
respondence of the underlying one-shot game contains a sub-correspondence having the?-
limit property (i.e., if the Nash payo? selection sub-correspondence contains its ?-limits
and therefore is a? correspondence), then the discounted stochastic game has a stationary
Markov equilibrium. Our key result is a new ?xed point theorem for measurable-selection-
valued correspondences having the ?-limit property. We also show that if the discounted
stochastic game is noisy (Duggan, 2012), or if the underlying probability space satis?es
the G-nonatomic condition of Rokhlin (1949) and Dynkin and Evstigneev (1976) (and
therefore satis?es the coaser transition kernel condition of He and Sun, 2014), then the
Nash payo? selection correspondence contains a sub-correspondence having the ?-limit
property. Key words and phrases : approximate Caratheodory selections, ?xed points of
nonconvex valued correspondences, measurable selection valued correspondences, Komlos
limits, Komlos’ Theorem, weak star convergence, discounted stochastic games, stationary
Markov equilibria.
JEL classi?cation: C7
1 Introduction
For a discounted stochastic game with an uncountable state space and compact metric
action spaces, we show that if the measurable-selection-valued, Nash payo? selection cor-
respondence of the underlying one-shot game contains a sub-correspondence having the
?-limit property (i.e., if the Nash payo? selection sub-correspondence contains its ?-
limits and therefore is a ? correspondence), then the discounted stochastic game has a
stationary Markov equilibrium. We will refer to all such discounted stochastic games as
?-class discounted stochastic games. Our key result is a new ?xed point theorem for
measurable-selection-valued correspondences having the ?-limit property. The steps in
the logic are as follows: First, we show that if the Nash payo? selection correspondence
is a ?-correspondence, then it is upper semicontinuous and takes nonempty compact val-
ues, with respect to the weak star topology, and if in addition the dominating probability
measure for the game is nonatomic then it takes nonempty compact and contractible
values (i.e., if Nash payo? selection correspondence a ?-correspondence and the dominat-
ing probability measure is nonatomic, then the Nash payo? selection correspondence is a
??-??-USCO taking contractible values).1 Because the Nash payo? selection correspon-
dence takes contractible values, it is ??-??-approximable and therefore, has ?xed points.
According to Blackwell’s Theorem (extended to DSGs), in order for the DSG to possess
stationary Markov equilibria it is necessary and su?cient that the Nash payo? selection
correspondence belonging to the DSG have ?xed points. We note that our su?ciency con-
dition (the ? limit property) for approximability rules out the key pathology underlying
recent existence counter examples due to Levy (2013) and Levy and McLennan (2014).
In particular, contractibility rules out Nash equilibria homeomorphic to the unit circle.
We also show that if the discounted stochastic game is noisy (Duggan, 2012), or if
the underlying probability space satis?es the G-nonatomic condition of Rokhlin (1949)
and Dynkin and Evstigneev (1976) (and therefore satis?es the coaser transition kernel
condition of He and Sun, 2014), then the Nash payo? selection correspondence contains
a sub-correspondence having the ?-limit property. Thus, all noisy and all G-nonatomic
discounted stochastic games are ?-class.
2 Discounted Stochastic Games
In an ?-player, non-zero sum, discounted stochastic game, players seek to choose strate-
gies that will maximize the sum of their discounted future payo?s. The game-theoretic
model we will consider here is essentially the model of Nowak and Raghavan (1992). Our
objective is to show that if a discounted stochastic game is approximable, then it has
stationary Markov equilibria. We begin by listing the primitives and assumptions of the
Nowak and Raghavan class of models.
2.1 Primitives and Assumptions
We will use the term correspondence to mean a set-valued mapping, ? : ? ?? ? (?),
taking nonempty values. Here, ? (?) denotes the collection of all nonempty subsets of ?.
Now to the speci?cs.
1Using methods introduced by Nowak (2003) - i.e., by dividing the state space into a nonatomic part
and an atomic part - we can show that if the Nash payo? selection correspondence is contractibly-valued
on the nonatomic part, then it is contractibly valued on all of the probability space.
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An ?-person, non-zero sum discounted stochastic game is de?ned by the following
primitives:
??? :=
©
(?? ??? ?)? (?????(·)? ??(·? ·)? ??)??? ? ?(·|·? ·)
ª
? (1)
where ??? satis?es the following list of assumptions [DSG-1]:
(1) ? is a ?nite set of players consisting of |?| = ? players,
(2) (?? ??? ?) is the state space with typical element ? where ? is a complete, separable
metric (Polish) space with metric ?? equipped with Borel ?-?eld ?? and probability
measure ?;
(3) ?? is the space of actions available to player ? with typical element ?? where ?? is a
compact, convex subset of a locally convex Hausdor? topological vector space ??,
metrizable - with metric ??? - for the relative topology inherited from ??;
(4) ??(·) is the feasible action correspondence, a measurable set-valued mapping from
the state space ? into the nonempty, ???-compact, convex subsets of ?? with graph
????(·) := {(?? ??) ? ?×?? : ?? ? ??(?)} ? (2)
Because ??(·) is ???-compact-valued and maps from a separable metric space ? to a
??? -compact metric space ??, the measurability of ??(·) is equivalent to ??(·) having a
measurable graph. Thus, the measurability of ??(·) is equivalent to ????(·) ? ??×???? ?
Letting ? :=
Q
??? ??, equip ? with the sum metric,
?? :=
X
?
??? ,
a metric compatible with the product topology on ?. Thus, ? is the ??-compact, convex
subset of all possible action pro?les in ? :=
Q
??? ?? with typical element ? = (??? ???) ?
?. Letting
?(·) := ?1(·)× · · · ×??(·) :=
Q
??? ??(·)? (3)
?(·) is also a measurable set-valued mapping (Lemma 18.4, Aliprantis-Border, 2006) from
the state space ? into the nonempty, ??-compact, convex subsets of ?. In each state
? ? ?, ??(?) ? ?? is the ???-compact, convex subset of feasible actions available to
player ? in state ?, while ?(?) ? ? is the ??-compact, convex subset of feasible action
pro?les (?-tuples) available to players in state ?. Letting ???(·) denote the graph of
?(·), we have
???(·) := {(?? ?) ? ?×? : ? ? ?(?)} ? ?? ×??? (4)
(5) ??(·? ·) is player ?0? real-valued payo? function de?ned on ? × ?, such that for all
players ? ? ? (i) |??(?? ?)| ?? for all (?? ?) ? ?×?, (ii) ??(·? ?) is measurable on
? for all ? ? ?, (iii) ??(?? ·) is continuous and multilinear on ? for all ? ? ?;
(6) ?(·|·? ·) is the law of motion such that (i) for all (?? ?) ? ?×? the probability measure
?(·|?? ?) de?ned on (?? ??) is absolutely continuous with respect to the probability
measure ? de?ned on (?? ??) (i.e., ?(·|?? ?) ?? ? for all (?? ?) ? ?×?), (ii) for all
sets ? ? ??, ?(?|·? ·) is measurable on ?×?, and (iii) the collection of probability
density functions
?? := {?(·|?? ?) : (?? ?) ? ?×?}
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of ?(·|?? ?) with respect to ? is such that for each state ? ? ? the function
? := (??? ???) ?? ?(?0|?? ??? ???) is continuous in ? and a?ne in ??
a.e.[?] in ?0.
2.2 Continuation Values
Players in a discounted stochastic game are guided in making their strategy choices by
state-contingent prices or values. For each player ?, this vector of state-contingent values is
given by a function, ?? : ? ?? ?, and therefore players’ state-contingent values are given
by a value function pro?le, ? := (?1? ? ? ? ? ??). As in the literature on discounted stochastic
games (e.g., see Nowak and Raghavan, 1991), the space of players’ value function pro?les
is given by
L?? := L??1 × · · · × L??? ?
where for each player ? = 1? 2? ? ? ? ??, L??? is space of ?-equivalence classes of functions,
?? : ? ?? ?, such that ??(?) ? ?? a.e. [?]. For each player ?, ?? is the closed bounded
interval, [???? ], the same for each player. Players’ payo?s (both immediate and dis-
counted) reside in closed, bounded, convex subset, ? := ?1 × · · · × ?? = [???? ]?,
and thus, players’ value function pro?les reside in the space, L?? , a metrizable, weak star
compact, convex subset of L??? .
Formally, let L1?(???) := L1? denote the separable Banach space of ?-equivalence
classes of ?-integrable functions, ? : ? ?? ? with norm
k?k1 :=
R
? |?| ???
Also, denote by ?1? the prequotient of L1? (i.e., the space of all real-valued, integrable
functions), and let
L1?? := L1? × · · · × L1?| {z }
? times
denote the separable Banach space of ?-equivalence classes of ?-integrable functions, ? :
? ?? ??, ? := (?1? ? ? ? ??? ? ? ? ? ??), with norm
k?k1 =
?X
?=1
k??k1 ?
Next, let L?? denote the Banach space of ?-equivalence classes of ?-essentially bounded
functions, ? : ? ?? ? with norm
k?k? := ???sup? := inf {? ? ? : ?{? : |?(?)| ? ?} = 0} .
L?? is the norm dual of L1?. Equip L?? with the weak star topology, denoted by ?? or
?(L?? ?L1?). We will denote by ??? the prequotient of L?? (i.e., the space of all real-valued,
?-essentially bounded functions).
For ? = 1? 2? ? ? ? ??, let ?? be the closed bounded interval [???? ] ? ?, and let
L??? := {? ? L?? : ?(?) ? ?? a.e. [?]} .
Equip L??? with the compact and metrizable relative weak star topology, denoted by ???
or ?(L??? ?L1??).2 To ?x the metric and hence the notation, let ???? be the metric on L???
2Because the Borel ?-?eld ?? is countably generated, the space of ?-equivalence classes of ?-integrable
functions, L1?, is separable. As a consequence, the set of value function ?-equivalence classes L??? is a
compact, convex, and metrizable subset of L?? for the weak star topology (e.g., see Nowak and Raghavan,
1992).
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compatible with the weak star topology. Also, let ??? denote the metric on ?? where for
? and ?0 in ??, ???(?? ?
0) := |?? ?0|.
Finally, let ? := ?1 × · · · ×?? and consider the Cartesian product,
L?? := L??1 × · · · × L??? ?
equipped with the the sum metric,
??? :=
P?
?=1 ???? ?
a metric compatible with the relative weak star product topology, ??, on L?? , and equip
? with the sum metric
?? :=
P?
?=1 ??? .
2.3 The Parameterized Collection of One-Shot Games
We know from Blackwell’s Theorem (1965) - extended to stochastic games - that in
order to ?nd conditions su?cient to guarantee the existence of stationary Markov equilib-
rium, we must focus on the discounted stochastic game’s underlying collection of one-shot
games. This collection of one-shot games is parameterized by states and value func-
tion pro?les. Thus, each value function pro?le, ?, identi?es a particular collection of
state-contingent, one shot ?-games. The crux of the problem is to identify the correct
collection of state-contingent ?-games for players to play - or more speci?cally to identify
the correct value function pro?le, say ??. This problem is a ?xed point problem. Our
main contribution, therefore, will take the form of a ?xed point result for the nonconvex,
measurable-selection-valued Nash payo? selection correspondence. Thus, as a consequence
of Blackwell’s Theorem, our objective will to identify conditions su?cient to guarantee
that the Nash payo? selection correspondence, induced from the Nash payo? correspon-
dence, has ?xed points. We will then be able to deduce, via our ?xed point results, that a
correct collection of state-contingent, one-shot ?-games exists, and via Blackwell’s Theo-
rem, we will be able to conclude that the discounted stochastic game to which this correct
collection of state-contingent ?-games belongs has a stationary Markov equilibrium.
We begin by discussing a ???0? underlying parameterized collection of one-shot
games.
2.3.1 The Ingredients
Given discounted stochastic game,
??? :=
©
(?? ??? ?)? (?????(·)? ??(·? ·)? ??)??? ? ?(·|·? ·)
ª
?
with dominating probability measure, ?, and discount rate pro?le, ? := (?1? ? ? ? ? ??), we
have for each (?? ?) ? ?×L?? , a one-shot game given by
G(?? ?) := {??(?)? ??(?? (·? ·)? ??)}??? ,
where for each action choice pro?le, ? = (??? ???) ? ?, player ?0? expected one-shot payo?
is
??(?? (??? ???)? ??)
:= (1? ??)??(?? (??? ???)) + ??
R
? ??(?
0)?(??0|?? (??? ???))
= (1? ??)??(?? (??? ???)) + ??
R
? ??(?
0)?(?0|?? (??? ???))??(?0)?
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Letting
?(?? ?? ?) := (?1(?? ?? ?1)? ? ? ? ? ??(?? ?? ??),
under assumptions [DSG-1], we can show that in each state, ? ? ?, each player’s expected
payo? function, (?? ??) ?? ??(?? ?? ??) ? ??, is ??×??? -continuous in (?? ??) ? ?× L??? .
- so that in each state, ? ? ?, the ?-valued function,
(?? ?) ?? ?(?? ?? ?) ? ??
is ??×??-continuous in (?? ?) ? ?×L?? (see the Appendix 1: Mathematical Preliminaries).
A pro?le of action choices, ?? ? ?(?), is a Nash equilibrium for the one-shot game,
G(?? ?), if for each player ?
??(?? (???? ????)? ??) = max?????(?) ??(?? (??? ????)? ??).
Under assumptions [DSG-1] the one-shot game, G(?? ?), always has a nonempty, ??-
compact set of Nash equilibria, N (?? ?), and using Berge’s Maximum Theorem it is
straightforward to show that the Nash correspondence,
N (·? ·) : ?×L?? ?? ?? (?)
is upper Caratheodory (i.e., N (·? ·) is product measurable in ? and ? and ??-?-upper
semicontinuous in ? with nonempty, ??-compact values). Moreover, it is straightforward
to show that the Nash payo? correspondence,
P(·? ·) : ?×L?? ?? ?? (?),
given by
P(?? ?) := {? ? ? : ? = ?(?? ?? ?) for some ? ? N (?? ?)} ,
is also upper Caratheodory (i.e., P(·? ·) is product measurable in ? and ? and ??-?-upper
semicontinuous in ? with nonempty, ??-compact values). We will denote by
UC??-? := UC(?×L?? ? ?? (?)) and UC??-? := UC(?×L?? ? ?? (?))
the collection of all upper Caratheodory correspondences de?ned on ?×L?? taking values
in ?? (?) and ?? (?) respectively. Thus, under assumptions [DSG-1],
N (·? ·) ? UC??-? and P(·? ·) ? UC??-? ?
2.3.2 From Action Choices to Strategies
Given a value function pro?le, ? ? L?? , the collection of one-shot games becomes a
collection of state-contingent one-shot games,
? ?? G(?? ?) := {??(?)? ??(?? (·? ·)? ??)}??? ,
with state contingent Nash correspondence, ? ?? N (?? ?), and state-contingent Nash
payo? correspondence, ? ?? P(?? ?). We can then measurably string together, state-by-
state, Nash equilibria to form a pro?le of Nash equilibrium strategies,
? ?? ??(?) := (??1(?)? ? ? ? ? ???(?)).
For each ?, ??(?) is a Nash equilibrium for the one-shot ?-game, G(?? ?), in state ?.
Thus, for each player ?, the (??? ???)-measurable function, ??(·) : ? ?? ??, is player
?0? action choice strategy. We will write
??(·) ? ?(N (·? ?)) := ?(N?)
to denote that ??(·) is a Nash equilibrium strategy for the collection of one-shot state-
contingent, ?-games, G(?? ?)???. Thus, ??(·) ? ?(N?) is an everywhere (??? ??)-
measurable selection of the ?-Nash correspondence, ? ?? N (?? ?).
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2.3.3 Everywhere Nash Payo? Selections
Let ?(P(·? ?)) := ?(P?) denote the collection of all (??? ??)-measurable selections of
the Nash payo? correspondence, ? ?? P(?? ?). Thus, ?(·) ? ?(P?) if and only if
?(?) ? P(?? ?) for all ?. By the Measurable Implicit Function Theorem (Himmelberg,
1975, Theorem 7.1), for ?(·) ? ?(P?), there exists ??(·) ? ?(N?) such that ?(?) =
?(?? ??(?)? ?) for all ? and ?(·? ??(·)? ?) ? ?(P?). Conversely, if ??(·) ? ?(N?), then
?(·? ??(·)? ?) ? ?(P?).
2.3.4 Payo?s and Probabilities under Stationary Markov Strategies
A stationary Markov strategy for player ?, is a (??? ???)-measurable function, ??(·) :
? ?? ??, such that ??(?) ? ??(?) for all ?. Thus, the collection of all player ? station-
ary Markov strategies is given by ?(??), the collection of all (everywhere) measurable
selections of ??(·).3 A Markov strategy pro?le is given by,
(?1(·)? ? ? ? ? ??(·)) ? ?(?),
where
?(?) :=
Y
???
?(??)
is the collection of all such pro?les.
Let
??? (?(·))(?) :=
?
?
?
??(?? ?(?)) for ? = 1R
? ??(?
0? ?(?0))???1(?0|?? ?(?)) for ? ? 2?
(5)
denote the ??? period expected payo? to player ? under Markov strategy pro?le ?(·)
starting at state ? given law of motion ?(·|·? ·). Here, for ? ? 2, ??(·|?? ?(?)) is de?ned
recursively by
??(?|?? ?(?))
=
R
? ?(?|?0? ?(?0))???1(?0|?? ?(?))?
?
?
? (6)
The discounted expected payo? to player ?, with discount rate ?? ? [0? 1), over an in?nite
time horizon under Markov strategy pro?le ?(·) starting at state ? is given by
???? (?(·))(?) :=
P?
?=1 ?
??1
? ???? (?(·))(?)? (7)
A stationary Markov strategy pro?le ??(·) ? ?(?) is a stationary Markov equilibrium
if for all players ? and in all states ?,
???? (???(·)? ????(·))(?) ? ???? (?0?(·)? ????(·))(?)?
for all other strategies, ?0?(·) ? ?(??).
3Thus, ??(·) ? ?(??) if and only if
??(·) : ? ?? ?
is (??? ???)-measurable and ??(?) ? ??(?) for all ?. Such a strategy is stationary because it does not
depend on time (the same strategy applies at all time points). Such a strategy is Markov because the
action choice speci?ed by the strategy in a function of the current state - and nothing else.
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2.4 Other Continuity Properties
In the underlying one-shot game, each player’s expected payo? function, ??(·? ·? ·) for
? = 1? 2? ? ? ? ??, is given by,
??(?? ?? ??) :=
Z
?
[(1? ??)??(?? ?) + ????(?0)?(?0|?? ?)]| {z }
??(??????(?0))
??(?0). (8)
Let
?(?? ?? ?) := (?1(?? ?? ?1)? ? ? ? ? ??(?? ?? ??)
and
?(?? ?? ?(?0)) := (?1(?? ?? ?1(?0))? ? ? ? ? ??(?? ?? ??(?0)).
(1) By part (iii) of assumption (6) we have via Sche?ee’s Theorem (see Billingsley,
1986, Theorem 16.11) that
sup??B(?) |?(?|?? ??)? ?(?|?? ??)|?
?
R
? |?(?0|?? ??)? ?(?0|?? ??)|? ??(?0)? 0?
?
?
? (9)
for any sequence of action pro?les {??}? in ?(?) converging to ?? ? ?(?). Thus, ?? ???? ?
?
implies that
sup??B(?) |?(?|?? ??)? ?(?|?? ??)|? ?? 0?
sometimes written k?(·|?? ??))? ?(·|?? ??)k? ?? 0?
(2) As noted above, under assumptions (5) and (6), in each state, ? ? ?, each player’s
expected payo? function, (?? ??) ?? ??(?? ?? ??) ? ??, is ??×??? -continuous in (?? ??) ?
?×L??? - so that in each state, ? ? ?, the ?-valued function,
(?? ?) ?? ?(?? ?? ?) ? ??
is ??×??-continuous in (?? ?) ? ?×L?? . In fact, we can say more about the collection of
functions, ?(?? ·? ?) : ? ?? ?, for (?? ?) ? ?× L?? . In particular, for each state ? ? ?
the collection of functions,
{?(?? ·? ?) : ? ? L?? } ,
is uniformly equicontinuous on ?(?).4 To see this, let
????(·) := (1? ??)??(?? ·) + ??
R
? ??(?
0)?(?0|?? ·))??(?0)?
For ?xed ?, we have for each ? ? L??
|????(?)? ????(?0)|
? (1? ??) |??(?? ?)? ??(?? ?0)|
+???
¯¯R
? ?(?
0|?? ?)??(?0)? R? ?(?0|?? ?0)??(?0)¯¯ ?
Because
??(?? ·) and ??(?) :=
Z
?
?(?0|?? ·)??(?0)
4The collection,
?
?(?? ·? ?) : ? ? L??
?
, is uniformly equicontinuous if for any ? ? 0 there is a ? ? 0
such that for any ? and ?0 in ?(?) with ??(?? ?0) ? ?,
??(?(?? ?? ?)? ?(?? ?0? ?)) ? ?,
for all ? ? L?? .
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are continuous functions on a compact set, and hence uniformly continuous, for any ?2 ? 0
there is a ? ? 0 such that for any ? and ?0 in ?(?) with ??(?? ?0) ? ?
|??(?? ?)? ??(?? ?0))| ? ?2
and
|??(?)???(?0)| ? ?2 .
2.5 Nash Payo? Selections
2.5.1 The De?nition
A Nash payo? selection is a function, ?(·) ? L?? such that ?? ? P(?? ?) a.e. [?] for some
?xed value function pro?le, ? ? L?? . Given parameterized games, {G(?? ?)}(???)??×L?? ,
satisfying assumptions [DSG-1] with Nash payo? correspondence, P(·? ·) ? UC??-? , the
induced Nash payo? selection correspondence is given by
? ?? ??(P?) :=
©
?(·) ? L?? : ?? ? P(?? ?) a.e. [?]
ª
.
Thus, for each value function pro?le ?, S?(P?) is the set of all ?-equivalence classes of
measurable selections of the measurable correspondence,
? ?? P?(?) := P(?? ?),
Recall that ??(P?) denotes the prequotient of ??(P?) while ?(P?) denotes the set of
all everywhere measurable selections of P?(·) (for a given ?).5 Because the Nash payo?
correspondence, ? ?? P?(?), is (??? ??)-measurable with nonempty compact values in
?, by the Kuratowski-Ryll-Nardzewski Selection Theorem (1965), P?(·) has (??? ??)-
measurable selections (i.e., ??(P?) 6= ?).
2.5.2 Decomposability
In general, a subset S of L?? is said to be decomposable if for any two functions ?0(·) and
?1(·) in S and for any ? ? ??, we have
?0(·)??(·) + ?1(·)??\?(·) ? S.
For the Nash payo? correspondence, P(·? ·) : ?×L?? ?? ?? (?), an upper Caratheodory
correspondence, for each ? ? L?? , the induced Nash payo? selection correspondence,
S?(P(·)), takes decomposable values. Moreover, for each ?, S?(??) is k·k1-closed (or
L1??-closed) in L??? . Thus, for any sequence {??(·)}? in S?(P?) converging in L1??-norm
to ?0(·) ? L??? , we have ?0(·) ? S?(P?). We will denote by ??1S?(P?) the L1??-closure of
S?(P?) in L??? . By Lemma 1 in Pales and Zeidan (1999), we know that, in addition to
S?(P?) being decomposable, S?(P?) is L1??-closed in L??? . Thus, we have
??1S?(P?) = S?(P?).
We also know by Corollary 1 in Pales and Zeidan (1999) that
??1S?(P?) =
n
?(·) ? L??? : ? {??(·)}? ? S?(P?) such that lim?
°°°??(·) ? ?(·)°°°
1
= 0
o
.
Finally, note that L?? is L1??-closed in L??? and decomposable.
5A (??? ??)-measurable function, ?(·), is an everywhere measurable selection of P?(·) provided ?? ?
P?(?) for all ? ? ?.
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2.5.3 Sequences of Nash Payo? Selections and Sequences of Nash Equilibria
Consider a sequence, n
(??? ??(·)
o
?
? ????(P(·)) ? L?? ×L?? ,
where for each ?, ??(·) ? L?? is a Nash payo? selection, that is,
??? ? P(?? ??) a.e. [?].
Let ?? be the exceptional set (i.e., the set of ?-measure zero) such for ? ? ?\??,
??? ? P(?? ??) for all ?.
For each ?, we have by the Measurable Implicit Function Theorem (e.g., Himmelberg,
1975, Theorem 7.1) a (??? ??)-measurable function, ??(·) : ? ?? ?, such that for each
? and ? ? ?\??, ??(?) ? N (?? ??). Thus, we have for each ? and ? ? ?\??,
??? = ?(?? ??(?)? ??) for all ? ? ?\??, (10)
where
?(?? ??(?)? ??) := (?1(?? ??(?)? ??1 )? ? ? ? ? ??(?? ??(?)? ???))?
Note that under assumptions [DSG-1], the sequence {??(·)}? ? L1?? is k·k1-bounded.
2.6 The Problem
As we have discussed in the introduction, by Blackwell’s Theorem (1965) we know that a
stationary Markov strategy pro?le,
??(·) := (??1(·)? ? ? ? ? ???(·)) ? ?(N??)?
is a Nash equilibrium of a discounted stochastic game if and only if there exists a pro?le
of continuation values (or value functions), ?? := (??1 ? ? ? ? ? ???) ? L?? such that ??(?) ?
P(?? ??) for all ?, i.e., such that,
??(·) := (??1(·)? ? ? ? ? ???(·)) ? ?(P??)?
and such that together the pair, (??(·)? ??(·)) ? ?(N??)×?(P??). Equivalently, ??(·) is a
stationary Markov equilibrium if and only if the pair, (??(·)? ??(·)), satisfy the following
system of equations:
for players ? = 1? 2? ? ? ? ?? and for all initial states ?
???(?) = (1? ??)??(?? ??(?)) + ??
Z
?
???(?0)?(?0|?? ??(?))??(?0)| {z }
??(????(?)????)
(11)
and
??(?? ???(?)? ????(?)? ???) = max????(?) ??(?? ?? ????(?)? ???). (12)
Thus, if for the given strategy pro?le, ??(·), ??(·), satis?es state-by-state for each player ?
the Bellman equations (11), and if for the given value function pro?le, ??(·), ??(·), satis?es
state-by-state for each player ? the Nash conditions (12), then together, (??(·)? ??(·)),
satisfy Blackwell’s conditions, and by Blackwell’s Theorem, ??(·) is a stationary Markov
equilibrium of the discounted stochastic game with underlying state-contingent, collection
of one-shot games, {G(?? ??)}???.
9
Note that if (?? ?) ?? N (?? ?) is the Nash equilibria correspondence for the one-shot
game, (?? ?) ?? G(?? ?), and if (?? ?) ?? P(?? ?) is the induced Nash equilibria payo?
correspondence given by
P(?? ?) := {? ? ? : ?? = ??(?? ?? ??)?? and some ? ? N (?? ?)}
then by Blackwell’s Theorem (1965) the discounted stochastic game with underlying col-
lection of one-shot games,
G(?? ?)(???)??×L?? ?
has a stationary Markov equilibrium if and only if there is a value function pro?le, ??,
such that
??(?) ? P(?? ??) a.e. [?],
or equivalently, if and only if there is a value function pro?le, ??, such that
?? ? S?(P(·? ??)),
where for each ?, S?(P(·? ?)) is the set of ?-equivalence classes of measurable selections
of the Nash payo? correspondence, ? ?? P(?? ?). Once we have found a ?xed point,
?? ? S?(P??) := S?(P(·? ??))?
or equivalently a solution to the Bellman inclusion and in particular, a ?? ? L?? such that
??(?) ? P(?? ??) a.e. [?],
we can easily deduce the existence of an everywhere measurable selection ?? ? ?(P(·? ??))
such that ?? = ?? a.e. [?] and from this we can easily deduce the existence of the strat-
egy pro?le, ??(·), such that ??(·) ? ?(N (·? ??)) using the Measurable Implicit Function
Theorem (e.g., Himmelberg, 1975, Theorem 7.1). Thus, in order to establish the exis-
tence of a stationary Markov equilibrium for our discounted stochastic game it follows
from Blackwell’s Theorem (1965) that it is both necessary and su?cient that there ex-
ists a ?xed point, ??, of the corresponding the Nash payo? selection correspondence,
? ?? S?(P(·? ?)) or equivalently, that the Bellman inclusion have a solution. Formally,
we have the following variation on Blackwell’s Theorem (1965):
Theorem 1 (Necessary and su?cient conditions for the existence of stationary Markov
equilibria):
Let
??? :=
©
(?? ??? ?)? (?????(·)? ??(·? ·)? ??)??? ? ?(·|·? ·)
ª
?
be a discounted stochastic game satisfying assumptions [DSG-1], with Nash payo?
correspondence, P(·? ·), for the underlying one-shot game. Then DSG has a stationary
Markov equilibrium if and only if the Nash payo? selection correspondence,
? ?? S?(P(·? ?)),
has a ?xed point.
As a consequence of Theorem 1 above, our su?cient conditions for existence will
take the form of a new ?xed point theorem for nonconvex, measurable-selection-valued
correspondences.
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3 ?-Class Discounted Stochastic Games
While the Nash payo? selection correspondence,
? ?? S?(P?)?
takes nonempty, decomposable, L1?-norm closed values in L?? (see Pales and Zeidan,
1999). In general, S?(P(·)) is neither ??-closed valued nor convex-valued. This makes the
?xed point problem we must solve in order to establish existence very di?cult. However,
we will show that if the Nash payo? selection correspondence, S?(P(·)), contains a sub-
correspondence, ??(·)? having the ?-limit property (i.e., if S?(P(·)) contains a sub-
correspondence ??(·) that is a ?-correspondence), then this sub-correspondence, ??(·),
is a ??-??-USCO and if, in addition, the dominating probability measure ? is nonatomic,
then ??(·) is a ??-??-USCO taking contractible values. By dividing the state space
into a nonatomic part and an atomic part, we can then show (using methods introduced
by Nowak, 2003) that if the Nash payo? selection correspondence is contractibly-valued
on the nonatomic part, it is contractibly valued on all of the probability space. Due to
contractibility, we will be able to conclude via results due to Gorniewicz, Granas, and
Kryszewski (1991) that ??(·), is ??-??-approximable and therefore has ?xed points.
3.1 Approximable Sub-Correspondences
Let {G(?? ?)}(???)??×L?? be the collection of one-shot games underlying discounted sto-
chastic game, ???, satisfying [DSG-1] having Nash correspondence, N (·? ·) ? UC??-?,
and Nash payo? correspondence, P(·? ·) ? UC??-? .
Consider the induced Nash payo? selection correspondence,
? ?? S?(P?) :=
©
?(·) ? L?? : ?? ? P(?? ?) a.e. [?]
ª
.
The Nash payo? selection correspondence, S?(P(·)), is in general not a ??-??-USCO,
nor is it convex valued. But it may contain a sub-correspondence that is a ??-??-USCO -
and not only that, but S?(P(·)) may contain a sub-correspondence which is contractibly
valued. Are there conditions su?cient to guarantee that S?(P(·)) contains a contractibly
valued ??-??-sub-USCO?
We say that a correspondence
??(·) : L?? ?? ? (L?? )
is a sub-correspondence belonging to S?(P(·)), denoted by
??(·) ? SC[S?(P(·))],
if
????(·) ? ??S?(P(·)),
where
????(·) := ©(?? ?(·)) ? L?? ×L?? : ?(·) ? ??(?)ª ,
and
??S?(P(·)) :=
©
(?? ?(·)) ? L?? ×L?? : ?(·) ? S?(P?)
ª
.
De?nition 1 (Approximable Sub-Correspondences)
We say that a Nash payo? selection sub-correspondence,
??(·) ? SC[S?(P(·))],
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is ??-??-approximable if for each ? ? 0, there exists a ??-??-continuous function,
??(·) : L?? ?? L?? ?
such that for each (?? ?(·)) ? ???? ? L?? ×L?? (i.e., for each (?? ?(·)) ? L?? ×L?? , with
?(·) = ??(?) ? L?? ) there exists
(?? ? (·)) ? ????(·) ? L?? ×L??
(i.e., there exists ? (·) ? ??(?)) such that
???(?? ?) + ???(?(·)? ? (·)) ? ?. (13)
Equivalently, for any ? ? 0
???? ? ???×??(??????(·)).
Thus, the graph of the continuous function ?? : L?? ?? L?? is contained in the ???×??-
open ball of radius ? about the graph of ??(·). If S?(P(·)) contains an ??-??-approximable
sub-USCO, ?(·), then S?(P(·)), is ??-??-approximable.
3.2 ?-Class Games
We have the following formal de?nition of the ?-limit property.
De?nition 2 (The ?-Limit Property and ?-Correspondences):
The Nash payo? selection correspondence, S?(P(·)), has the ?-limit property or is a
?-correspondence if there exists a sub-correspondence, ??(·) ? SC[S?(P(·))], such that
for any ?-converging sequence,
{(??? ??(·))}? ? L?? ×L?? ?
with ??(·) ? ??(??) for all ? and ?-limit, (b?? b?(·)) ? L?? ×L?? ,
b?(·) ? ??(b?).
If the graph of the Nash payo? selection correspondence, ??S?(P(·)) ? L?? × L?? ,
contains a ?-closed subset,
?? ? ??S?(P(·)) ? L?? ×L??
such that for all ? ? L?? ,
??(?) :=
©
?(·) ? L?? : (?? ?(·)) ? ??
ª 6= ??
then the induced mapping, ? ?? ??(?), is a ??-??-sub-USCO belonging to S?(P(·)).
Given sub-correspondence, ??(·) ? SC[S?(P(·))], consider a sequence,n
(??? ??(·)
o
?
? ????(·) ? L?? ×L?? ,
where for each ?, ??(·) ? L?? is a Nash payo? selection, that is,
??? ? P(?? ??) a.e. [?].
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Let ?? be the exceptional set (i.e., the set of ?-measure zero) such for ? ? ?\??,
??? ? P(?? ??) for all ?. For each ?, we have by the Measurable Implicit Function Theorem
(e.g., Himmelberg, 1975, Theorem 7.1) a (??? ??)-measurable function, ??(·) : ? ?? ?,
such that for each ? and ? ? ?\??, ??(?) ? N (?? ??). Thus, we have for each ? and
? ? ?\??,
??? = ?(?? ??(?)? ??) ? P(?? ??) a.e. [?],
and in fact, we have
{(??? ?(·? ??(·)? ??)}? ? ????(·) ? L?? ×L?? .
an alternative statement of the ?-limit property is
S?(P(·)), has the ?-limit property or is a ?-correspondence if there exists a
sub-correspondence, ??(·) ? SC[S?(P(·))], such that for any ?-converging sequence,
{(??? ?(·? ??(·)? ??))}? ? L?? × L?? ?
with ?(·? ??(·)? ??) ? ??(??) for all ? and ?-limit, (b?? b?(·)) ? L?? ×L?? ,
b?? ? ?(????{??(?)? b?) a.e. [?],
where
?(????{??(?)? b?) := {?(?? ?? b?) ? ? : ? ? ??{??(?)} .
If the parameterized collection of one-shot games, {G(?? ?)}(???)??×L?? , belonging to
a DSG satisfying [DsG-1] has a Nash payo? selection correspondence having the ?-limit
property we will refer to the DSG as being ?-class.
3.3 A Fixed Point Theorem for ?-Class Discounted Stochastic
Games
In this section, we will show that if the Nash payo? selection correspondence, S?(P(·)),
has a sub-correspondence,
??(·) ? SC[S?(P(·))]
that is a ?-correspondence, then this sub-correspondence is in fact a ??-??-sub-USCO
belonging to S?(P(·)). Moreover, if the probability measure, ?, on the state space, ?,
is nonatomic, then ??(·) takes contractible values. In fact, by dividing the state space
into a nonatomic part and an atomic part, we can, using methods introduced by Nowak
(2003), show that if the Nash payo? selection correspondence is contractibly-valued on the
nonatomic part, then it is contractibly valued on all of the probability space. Thus, the
? limit property alone is su?cient to show that a sub-correspondence, ??(·), belonging
to S?(P(·)) is a contractibly-valued sub-USCO. But here we will explicitly assume that
? is nonatomic and provide a proof that ??(·) is contractibly-valued with respect to the
metric ??? on L?? - a metric compatible the relative weak star topology on L?? ?
Theorem 2 (Any sub-correspondence, ?(·), belonging to S?(P(·)) having the ?-limit
property is a contractibly-valued USCO)
Let {G(?? ?)}(???)??×L?? be the parameterized one-shot game underlying a discounted
stochastic game satisfying assumptions [DSG-1] and let
S?(P(·)) : L?? ?? ? (L?? ),
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be the Nash payo? selection correspondence. If
??(·) ? SC[S?(P(·))]
is a ?-correspondence (i.e., has the ?-limit property), then
the following statements are true:
(1) The sub-correspondence, ? ?? ??(?), is a ??-??-USCO belonging to S?(P(·)), that
is,
??(·) ? U??-?? [S?(P(·))]?
(2) For ??(·) ? SC[S?(P(·))], if the underlying probability measure, ?, is nonatomic,
then for each ? ? L?? , ??(?) is contractible (with respect to the ??topology).
PROOF: (1) Because ??(·) has the ?-limit property, it follows from Komlos Theorem
and Theorem A2.3(1) that for each ? ? L?? , ??(?) is ??-compact. Therefore, to show
that ??(·) ? U??-?? , it su?ces to show that ????(·) is ???×??-closed in L?? ×L?? . Let
{(??? ??(·))}? be any sequence in ????(·) such that
?? ??
?
b? and ??(·) ??? b?(·).
Thus, {(??? ??(·))}? is a sequence of payo? selections (rather than a sequence of payo?
graph selections). By Theorem A2.3(1), we have ?? ??
??
?? and ??(·) ???? ?
?
(·) with ?? = b?
and b?(·) = ??(·) a.e. [?]. Also, we have for each ?,
??? ? P(?? ??) a.e. [?].
By the ?-limit property of ??(·), we have that
b?(·) ? ??(b?),
and given that b?(·) = ??(·) a.e. [?], we have
??(·) ? ??(b?).
Given that ?? = b? a.e. [?], we have P(?? ??) = P(?? b?) a.e. [?]. Thus, ??(·) ? ??(??) (i.e.,
implying that (??? ??(·)) ? ????(·).
(2) Next, for ??(·) ? U??-?? , we will show that if the dominating probability measure,
?, is nonatomic, then for each ?, ??(?) is contractible.
First, if the dominating probability measure, ?, is nonatomic, then as shown by
Fryszkowski (1983), Liapunov’s Theorem (1940) on the range of a vector measure guar-
antees the existence of a family of measurable sets, {??}??[0?1], such that
?0 ? ?? ??0 ? ??, ?0 = ? and ?1 = ?, and
?(??) = ??(?) = ?.
¾
(14)
Using the properties of this system of measurable sets and the decomposability of ??(?)
for each ? ? L?? , we will show that for each ? the function ??(·? ·) given by
??(?? ?) := ?1(·)???(·) + ?(·)??\??(·) ? ??(?) for all (?? ?) ? ??(?)× [0? 1] (15)
is a homotopy (and in particular, a contraction of ??(?) to ?1). Here ? ? L?? is ?xed,
??(·) is the indicator function of set ?? and ?1(·) is any ?xed selection in ??(?).
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It su?ces to show that ??(·? ·) is ???×|·|-???-continuous. Let {(??(·)? ??)}? be such a
sequence such that
??(·) ???? ?
?
(·) and ?? ??? ?
??
We must show that
??(??(·)? ??) ???? ??(?
?
(·)? ??) ? ??(?).
It su?ces to show that for all ? ? L1?? with k?k1 ? 1,
? =
R
?
?¡
?1????? (?)? ?1????? (?)
¢
? ?(?)
®
??(?)
+
R
?
?¡
??? ??\??? (?)? ?????\??? (?)
¢
? ?(?)
®
??(?) ?? 0?
Rewriting, expression ?, we have
? =
Z
?
?¡
?1????? (?)? ?1????? (?)
¢
? ?(?)
®
??(?)| {z }
(?)
+
Z
?
?¡
??? ??\??? (?)? ?
?
???\??? (?)
¢
? ?(?)
®
??(?)| {z }
(?)
+
Z
?
?¡
?????\??? (?)? ?
?
???\??? (?)
¢
? ?(?)
®
??(?)?| {z }
(?)
Because ?? ??
??
??, we haveR
?
?¡
??? ??\??? (?)? ?????\??? (?)
¢
? ?(?)
®
??(?)
+
R
? h(??? ???? (?)? ??????? (?)) ? ?(?)i ??(?)
=
R
? h(??? ? ???) ? ?(?)i ??(?) ?? 0?
Thus, (?) ?? 0. Given that ?? = [???? ] for all ?, we note that each of the expressions
(?) and (?) is less than or equal to 2? k?k1 ?(??? M ???), and given that k?k1 ? 1, we
have (?) + (?) ? 4??(??? M ???). We have, then,R
?
?¡
?1????? (?)? ?1????? (?)
¢
? ?(?)
®
??(?)
+
R
?
?¡
??? ??\??? (?)? ?????\??? (?)
¢
? ?(?)
®
??(?)
? 4??(??? M ???) +
R
?
?¡
??? ??\??? (?)? ?????\??? (?)
¢
? ?(?)
®
??(?)?
and as ? goes to in?nity
4??(??? M ???)
+
R
?
?¡
??? ??\??? (?)? ?????\??? (?)
¢
? ?(?)
®
??(?) ?? 0.
Thus, the ???×|·|-???-continuous function given in (15) for each ? ? L?? , together with
the properties of the Liapunov system (14) specify a homotopy for the set of measurable
selections, ?(?) - and thus for each ?, ?(?) is contractible. Q.E.D.
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Our proof that ?(?) is contractible for each ? is a modi?ed version of the proof given
by Mariconda (1992) showing that if the underlying probability space is nonatomic then
any decomposable subset of ?-valued, Bochner integrable functions in L1? is contractible
(where ? is a Banach space). In Mariconda’s result, the space of functions is equipped
with the norm in L1?, while here our space of functions (with each function taking values
in ? ? ??) is equipped with the metric, ??? , a metric compatible with the ?? topology.
3.3.1 Approximable Nash Payo? Selection Correspondences
The importance of the ?-limit property derives from the fact that it guarantees ??-??-
contractibility and this in turn guarantees approximability, as our next result shows.
Theorem 3 (If ?(·) ? SC[S?(P(·))] is a ? correspondence and ? nonatomic, then ?(·)
is ??-??-approximable)
Let {G(?? ?)}(???)??×L?? be the parameterized one-shot game underlying a discounted
stochastic game satisfying assumptions [DSG-1] and let
S?(P(·)) : L?? ?? ? (L?? ),
be the Nash payo? selection correspondence. If ??(·) ? SC[S?(P(·))] is a
?-correspondence, and if the dominating probability measure, ?, is nonatomic, then the
Nash payo? selection sub-correspondence,
? ?? ??(?)?
is a ??-??-approximable?
PROOF: By Corollary 5.6 in Gorniewicz, Granas, and Kryszewski (1991), because the
sub-USCO, ??(·), is de?ned on the ANR (absolute neighborhood retract) space of value
functions L?? taking nonempty, compact, and contractible values in L?? (and hence ?-
proximally connected values - see Theorem 5.3 in Gorniewicz, Granas, and Kryszewski,
1991), the sub-USCO, ??(·), is a ? mapping. Therefore, by Theorem 5.12 in Gorniewicz,
Granas, and Kryszewski (1991), ??(·) is ??-??-approximable. Q.E.D.
We can now state our main ?xed point result.
Theorem 4 (Fixed points for Nash payo? selection correspondences)
Let {G(?? ?)}(???)??×L?? be the parameterized one-shot game underlying a discounted
stochastic game satisfying assumptions [DSG-1] and having a Nash payo? selection
correspondence,
S?(P(·)) : L?? ?? ? (L?? ),
If ??(·) ? SC[S?(P(·))] is a ?-correspondence, and if the dominating probability
measure, ?, is nonatomic, then S?(P(·)) has a ?xed point (i.e., there exists ?? ? L??
such that ?? ? S?(P??)).
PROOF: By Theorem 3 above, ??(·) is ??-??-approximable. Therefore, we have for
each ?, a ??-??-continuous function,
??(·) : L?? ?? L?? ?
such that for each (??? ??) ? ???? ? L?? ×L?? (i.e., for each (??? ??) ? L?? ×L?? , with
?? = ??(??) ? L?? ) there exists
(??? ??) ? ???(·) ? L?? ×L??
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(i.e., there exists ?? ? ??(??)) such that
???(??? ??) + ???(??(·)? ?
?
(·)) ? 1?2 . (16)
Equivalently, for any positive integer, ?,
???? ? ???×??( 1?2 ?????(·)).
Thus, the graph of the continuous function ?? : L?? ?? L?? is contained in the ???×??-
open ball of radius 1?2 about the graph of ??(·).
Because each of the functions, ??, is ??-??-continuous and de?ned on the ??-compact
and convex subset, L?? , in L??? , taking values in L?? , it follows from the ?xed point
theorem of Schauder (see Aliprantis and Border, 2006), that each ?? has a ?xed point,
?? ? L?? (i.e., for each ? there exists some ?? ? L?? such that ?? = ??(??))? Let {??}? be
a ?xed point sequence corresponding to the sequence of ??-??-continuous approximating
functions, {??(·)}?. Expression (16) can now be rewritten as follows: for each ?? in the
?xed point sequence, there is a corresponding pair, (??? ??(·)) ? ????(·), such that
???(??? ??) + ???(??(??)? ?
?
(·)) ? 1?2 ,
and therefore such that
???(??? ??)| {z }
?
+ ???(??? ?
?
(·))| {z }
?
? 1?2 . (17)
By the ??-compactness of L?? , we can assume WLOG that the ?xed point sequence,
{??}? ? L?? , ??-converges to a limit ?? ? L?? . Thus, by part A of (17), as ? ?? ? we
have
?? ??
??
?? and ?? ??
??
???
and therefore by part B of (17), as ? ??? we have
?? ??
??
??.
Because ????(·) is ???×??-closed in L?? ×L?? ,
{(??? ??)}? ? ??S?(P(·)),
and ?? ??
??
?? and ?? ??
??
?? imply that
(??? ??) ? ????(·).
Therefore,
?? ? ??(??) ? S?(P??).
Q.E.D.
Given assumptions [DSG-1] it follows from Theorem 1 (Blackwell’s Theorem) and
Theorems 4 above that all ?-class discounted stochastic games have stationary Markov
equilibria (remember, as a consequence of Nowak, 2003, the ?-limit property is su?cient
to guarantee that S?(P(·)) has ?xed points).
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4 Conditions Su?cient for a ??? to be ?-Class
Thus far we have shown that if the graph of the Nash payo? selection correspondence,
??S?(P(·)), contains a ?-closed subset , ?? ? L?? ×L?? whose domain is all of L?? (i.e.,
????L?? (?
?) = L?? ), then
? ?? ??(?) :=
©
?(·) ? L?? : (?? ?(·)) ? ??
ª
is a ??-??-sub-USCO taking contractible values belonging to S?(P(·)). Are there condi-
tions su?cient to guarantee the existence of a ?-closed set, ??, with
?? ? ??S?(P(·)) ? L?? ×L?? ?
We turn now to consider conditions su?cient to guarantee that the Nash payo? selection
correspondence is a ?-correspondence.
4.1 Noisy Discounted Stochastic Games
An interesting sub-class of discounted stochastic games is the class of noisy DSGs recently
studied by Duggan (2012). In this subsection, we will show that all noisy discounted sto-
chastic games are ?-class. By specializing primitives and assumptions of our discounted
stochastic game model, we can easily make our model a noisy stochastic game model. We
need only modify assumptions (2) and (10) as follows:
In a noisy DSG (i.e., NDSG) the state space is given by ? := ?×? with typical element
? := (?? ?), where both ? and ? are complete separable metric spaces with metrics ?? and
?? , equipped with the Borel ?-?elds ?? and ?? . By structuring the state space in this
way, we can analyze situations where part of the riskiness is controllable (in a stochastic
sense) and part of the riskiness is only indirectly controllable or not controllable at all. In
particular, we can think of ? ? ? as being the stochastically controllable regular state, and
we can think of ? ? ? as being the indirectly stochastically controllable (or uncontrollable)
noisy state.
In an NDSG, the law of motion
((?? ?)|{z}
?
? ?) ?? ?(·|(?? ?)|{z}
?
? ?)
is given by
?(?(?0? ?0)|(?? ?)? ?) := ?(??0|?0)?(??0|(?? ?)? ?)?
or
?(?(?0? ?0)|?? ?) := ?(??0|?0)?(??0|?? ?)?
where ? = (?? ?) denotes the current state and ?0 = (?0? ?0) denotes the coming state - and
depending on the regular state ?0 chosen by the probability measure, ?(??0|?? ?), in current
state ? = (?? ?) given action pro?le ? ? ?(?), the noisy state ?0 will be chosen according
to the probability measure, ?(??0|?0). Thus, while regular states are directly stochastically
controllable via the stochastic kernel, ?(??0|?? ?), noisy states are only indirectly stochas-
tically controllable via ?(??0|?0). In this sense, we say that the discounted stochastic game
is noisy.
To complete our formal description of the noisy discounted stochastic game model,
assume that for all ?0 ? ? , the probability measure, ?(??0|?0), governing the choice of
the coming noisy state ?0 is absolutely continuous with respect to a probability measure,
?(??0), de?ned on the measurable space, (????), of noisy states.6 Also, assume that for all
6Duggan assumes that the dominating probability measure, ?, is nonatomic - but we will show that
this is not required for existence of stationary Markov equilibria.
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(?? ?) ? ?×?(?), the probability measure, ?(??0|?? ?), governing the choice of the coming
regular state ?0, given current state, ? := (?? ?) and action pro?le ? ? ?(?), is absolutely
continuous with respect to a probability measure, ?(??0), de?ned on the measurable space,
(???? ), of regular states. Thus, the noisy DSG has dominating probability measure given
by the product measure,
? := ?× ??
By the Corollary in Rao and Rao (1972), if ? is nonatomic, then ? is nonatomic.7
Let
?? := {?(??|?? ?) : (?? ?) ? ?×?} ,
be the collection of probability density functions of ?(·|?? ?) with respect to ? such that
for each state ? := (?? ?), the function
(??? ???) ?? ?(?0|(?? ?)? ??? ???)
is continuous in ? and a?ne in ?? a.e. [?] in ?0. Also, let
?? := {?(??0|?0) : ?0 ? ?} ,
be the collection of probability density functions of ?(·|?0) with respect to ? such that the
function
?0 ?? ?(?0|?0)
is measurable in ?0 a.e. [?] in ?0.
Specializing (2) and (10) in our list of assumptions, [DSG-1], above, label the new list
of assumptions [NSG-1].
Our ?rst result establishes that all noisy DSGs have Nash payo? selection correspon-
dences that are ?-correspondences.
Theorem 5 (For all noisy DSGs, S?(P(·)) is a ?-correspondence)
Suppose assumptions [DSG-1] hold. If the DSG is noisy, then the Nash payo? selection
correspondence,
? ?? S?(P(·? ?)) := S?(?(·?N (·? ?)? ?)),
is a ? correspondence.
PROOF: Let
{(??? ??(·))}? ? ??S?(P(·)),
be such that {(??? ??(·))}? ?-converges to ?-limit (b?? b?(·)) ? L?? × L?? . We must show
that b?? ? ??{???} a.e. [?].
First, let {??(·)}? be the sequence of measurable, ?-valued functions such that for
each ?,
??(?) ? N (?? ??) for all ?
and
??? = ?(?? ??(?)? ??) a.e. [?],
for all ?. Let ?? be the exceptional set. Thus, for all ?,
??? = ?(?? ??(?)? ??) for all ? ? ?\??.
7??? is an atom of ? relative to ?(·) if the following implication holds: if ?(?) ? 0, then ? ? ?
implies that ?(?) = 0 or ?(???) = 0. If ? contains no atoms relative to ?(·), ? is said to be atomless
or nonatomic. Because ?? is a complete, separable metric space ?(·) is atomless (or nonatomic) if and
only if ?({?}) = 0 for all ? ? ? (see Hildenbrand, 1974, pp 44-45).
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Next, recall
?? := {?(??0|(?? ?)? ?) : ((?? ?)? ?) ? (? × ?)×? }
be the collection of densities of ?(??0|(?? ?)? ?) with respect to probability measure ?(·)
- under assumptions [DSG-1](10) we know that for each state ? := (?? ?) ? ? × ? the
function
? := (??? ???) ?? ?(?0|(?? ?)? ??? ???) is continuous in ? and a?ne in ??
a.e.[?] in ?0.
For the sequence of valuation functions , {??}?, construct a new sequence, {? ?}?, by
letting
? ?(?0) :=
Z
?
??(?0? ?0)?(?0|?0) ? ??,
and consider the sequence of functions, {??(·? ·)}?, given by
(?? ?0) ?? ??(?? ?0) := ((1? ??)??(?? ??(?)) + ??? ?? (?0)?(?0|?? ??(?)))??? .
For each ?, the sequence of ??-valued integrable functions, {? ?? (·)?(·|?? ??(?))}? ?
L1?? , is uniformly integrable and therefore L1??-norm bounded. Moreover, for each ?,
???(?) ??
??
??(?) implies that for each player ?
R
? ?
??
? (?0)?(?0|?? ???(?))??(?0) ??
R
?
b??(?0)?(?0|?? ??(?))??(?0)?
Consider the sequence of 3-tuples,
? ?? {?(?? ??(?))? ??(?)? ??(?? ·)} ? ? ×? ×L1?? ,
where for each ?, ? ?? ??(?? ·) is a mapping from ? into L1?? . By Balder’s (1990)
extension of Komlos (1967), and by Komlos (1967), we can assume without loss of gener-
ality that there exists an exceptional set, b? , with ?( b?) = 0, and three functions (Komlos
limit functions), (b?(·)? b?(·)? b? (·? ·)), such that
? ?? (b?(?)? b?(?)? b? (?? ·)) ? ? ×? ×L1??
such that for all ? ? ?\ b? := (? × ?)\ b? ,
b??(?? ?) := 1?P??=1 ?(?? ?? ??(?? ?)) ?? b?(?? ?) by Komlos (1967),
b??(?? ?) := 1?P??=1 ??(?? ?) ?? b?(?? ?) by Komlos (1967),
1
?
P?
?=1 ? ?(?? ?? ·) ??? b? (?? ?? ·) by Balder (1990).
We have (see Ash, 1972)
?( b?) = Z
?
?( b?(?0))??(?0) = 0,
where b?(?0) := n?0 ? ? : (?0? ?0) ? b?o ?
implying that for some b? with ?(b? ) = 0? ?( b?(?0)) = 0 for all ?0 ? ?\b? . Thus for each
?0 ? ?\b? , b??(?0? ?0) ?? b?(?0? ?0) for ?0 a.e. [?].
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Because for all ?0, ?(??0|?0) is absolutely continuous with respect to ?, we have for each
?0 ? ?\b? , b? ?(?0) := 1? ?X
?=1
R
? ?
?(?0? ?0)?(?0|?0)
=
R
? [
1
?
?X
?=1
??(?0? ?0)]?(?0|?0)
=
R
? b??(?0? ?0)?(?0|?0)
??
R
? b?(?0? ?0)?(?0|?0)
:= b? (?0)?
We have therefore, ? ?(·) ??
?
b? (·) implying that ? ?(·) ??
??
b? (·).
We have by Balder’s extension of Komlos (see Theorem 4.1 in Balder, 1990), there
exists a subsequence, {???(·? ·)}, and a set, b??? , of ?-measure zero such that ,b??(?? ·) ??
?
b? (?? ·) ? L1?? , for all ? ? ?\ b? .
Therefore, for ? o? of b? ,Z
?
b??(?? ?0)??(?0) ?? Z
?
b? (?? ?0)??(?0) = b???
By Proposition 1 in Page (1991), for each ? o? of b? , there exists some ? ?(?? ?0) ?
??{??(?? ?0)} a.e. [?] in ?0 such thatZ
?
? ?(?? ?0)??(?0) =
Z
?
b? (?? ?0)??(?0) = b???
Given the fact that that ? ?(·) ??
??
b? (·), there exists some ??(·) ? ?(??{??(·)}, such that
for each ? o? of b?Z
?
? ?(?? ?0)??(?0) :=
Z
?
³
(1? ????(?? ??(?)) + ?? b??(?0)?(?0|?? ??(?))´? ??(?0) ? ??{???}?
Thus, we obtain the desired conclusion,b?? ? ??{???} for ? ? ?\ b? .
Q.E.D.
Next will discuss an interesting measure theoretic condition introduced by Rokhlin
(1949) and Dynkin and Evstigneev (1976) to ensure the existence of a convex set of
conditional selections of a measurable, closed valued correspondence. We will call this
condition the G-nonatomic condition.
4.2 G-Nonatomic Discounted Stochastic Games
Another interesting sub-class of DSGs recently studied by He and Sun (2013) is the class
of G-nonatomic DSGs. In this subsection we show that all G-nonatomic DSGs are ?-
class. This sub-class, called by He and Sun (2013) games with a coaser transition kernels,
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derives its usefulness from the work of Dynkin and Evstigneev (1976) and Rokhlin (1949).
The key ingredient making this so is the extension of Lyapunov’s Theorem (1940) due to
Dynkin and Evstigneev (1976). In what we do here, we go back to the de?nitions and
results of Dynkin and Evstigneev (1976) - rather than He and Sun (2013). Recall that here
we have assumed that the state space is a Polish space, ?? equipped with the Borel ?-?eld,
??, and a probability measure, ?, de?ned on ??. Also, recall that when ? is Polish, ? is
nonatomic if and only if ?({?}) = 0 for all ? ? ? (see Hildenbrand, 1974). Suppose now
that G is a sub-?-?eld of ??. Denote by ?G(·) a regular G-conditional probability given
sub-?-?eld G. Following Dynkin and Evstigneev, ? ? ?? is G-atom if ?(?) ? 0 and for
any ? ? ?? such that ? ? ?
?
©
? ? ? : 0 ? ?G(?)(?) ? ?G(?)(?)
ª
= 0.
Let ? : ? ?? ?? (?) be an arbitrary measurable correspondence taking nonempty,
closed values in ?. We will denote by
S?G (?) := {?(? |G) ? L?? (G) : ? ? S?(?)}
the collection of all ?-equivalence classes of regular G-conditional expectations of ?-
essentially bounded a.e. measurable selections of ?. The following extension of Lyapunov’s
Theorem is due to Dynkin and Evstigneev (1976).
Theorem 6 (An extension of Lyapunov’s Convexity Theorem)
Let ? : ? ?? ?? (?) be a measurable correspondence taking nonempty, closed values in
?. If for some sub-?-?eld, G, of ??, ?? contains no G-atoms, then
S?G (?) = S?G (???),
where ?? denotes the convex hull.
He and Sun (2013) give a slightly di?erent de?nition of G-atoms - one implied by
Dynkin and Evstigneev’s de?nition - and they show that if the state space underlying the
game is nonatomic and has no G-atoms, then the the discounted stochastic game has a
stationary Markov equilibrium. Our next result, a Corollary of Theorem 6, shows that
our condition, the ?-limit property, is implied by the absence of G-atoms.
Corollary to Theorem 6 (All G-nonatomic ???? are ?-class nonatomic ????)
Let {G(?? ?)}(???)??×L?? be the parameterized one-shot game underlying a discounted
stochastic game, ???, satisfying assumptions [DSG-1] and having a Nash payo?
selection correspondence,
S?(P(·)) : L?? ?? ? (L?? ).
If the underlying probability space, (?? ??? ?), is such that for some sub-?-?eld, G, of
??, ?? contains no G-atoms, then S?G (P(·)) has the ?-limit property, and in fact, is a
convex-valued, ??-??-sub-USCO of S?(P(·)).
PROOF: Let {(??? ??(·))}? be any sequence contained in??(S?(P(·))) such that ?? ????
?? ? L?? . We have for each ?, ??(?) ? P(?? ??) a.e. [?]. By the ? compactness of
L?? , we can assume WLOG that the sequence, {(??? ??(·))}?, ? converges with ? limit
(b?? b?(·)) ? L?? ×L?? . We have
b??(?) := 1?
?X
?=1
??(?) ?? b?(?) a.e. [?],
22
and by the properties of conditional expectations (see Ash, 1972),
?(b??|G)(?) := 1?
?X
?=1
?(??|G)(?) ?? ?(b? |G)(?) a.e. [?].
By Proposition 1 in Page (1991),
?(b? |G)(?) ? ????{?(??|G)(?)} a.e. [?].
By Dynkin and Evstigneev (1976),
????{?(??|G)(?)} = ??{?(??|G)(?)} a.e. [?].
and by the properties of conditional expectations, ????{?(??|G)(·)} ? S?G (P??). Thus,
?(b? |G)(?) ? ??{?(??|G)(?)} a.e. [?],
i.e., S?G (P(·)) has the ?-limit property. In fact, S?G (P(·)) is a convex-valued, and by
Theorem A2.3 is a ??-??-sub-USCO of S?(P(·)). Q.E.D.
5 Appendix 1: Mathematical Preliminaries
5.1 Hyperspaces
Let ? be a nonempty, closed subset of ?? and let ?? (?) denote the hyperspace of all
nonempty, closed (and hence compact) subsets of ?. Equip ?? (?) with the Hausdor?
metric ?? generated by the sum metric, ?? , on ?.8 Because (?? ??) is a compact metric
space, so too is the hyperspace, (?? (?)? ??).
Also, let (???? (L?? )? ???) denote the hyperspace of nonempty, ???-closed subsets of
L?? equipped with the Hausdor? metric generated by the underlying metric ??? . Because
(L?? ? ???) is a compact metric space, the hyperspace, (???? (L?? )? ???), is a compact
metric space.
Finally, let ?? (L?? ×?) denote the collection of all nonempty, ???×?-closed subsets of
L?? ×?, where ???×? denotes the sum metric, ???+?? ? on L?? ×?.9 Equip ?? (L?? ×?)
with Hausdor? metric, ???×? , generated by the metric, ???×? , on L?? × ?. Again,
because (L?? ×?? ???×?) is a compact metric space, so too is (?? (L?? ×?)? ???×?).
8The Hausdor? metric, ?? , on ?? (?) is de?ned as follows: for all ? and ? 0 in ?? (?), the Hausdor?
distance between ? and ? 0 is given by
??(?? ? 0) := max {??(??? 0)? ??(? 0? ? )}
where
the excess of ? over ? 0 is given by
??(?? ? 0) := sup??? ?????? (?? ? 0),
and
the excess of ? 0 over ? is given by
??(? 0? ? ) := sup?0?? 0 ?????? (?0? ? ),
and where
the distance from ? to ? 0 is given by
?????? (?? ? 0) := inf?0?? 0 ??(?? ?0)?
while the distance from ?0 to ? is given by
?????? (?0? ? ) := inf??? ???×?(?0? ?)?
9Thus, for (?? ?) and (?0? ?0) in L?? ×?,
???×?((?? ?)? (?0? ?0)) := ???(?? ?0) + ??(?? ?0)?
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5.2 Upper Caratheodory Correspondences
The correspondence,
?(·? ·) : ?×L?? ?? ?? (?),
is upper Caratheodory if ?(·? ·) is product measurable on ?×L?? and ??-?-upper semi-
continuous on L?? ? and for all
(?? ?) := (?? (?1? ? ? ? ? ??)) ? ?×L?? ,
?(?? ?) ? ?? (?).
For the correspondence, ?(·? ·), and subset ? of ?, let
??(? ) := {(?? ?) ? ?×L?? : ?(?? ?) ? ? 6= ?} ?
The correspondence, ?(·? ·), is product measurable if for each open subset, ?, of ?,
??(?) ? ?? × ?? , where ?? is the Borel product ?-?eld, ?? := ??1 × · · · × ??? in
?. For ?xed ?, the correspondence, ?(?? ·) := ??(·), is ??-?-upper semicontinuous if
??(??? ) := ??? (? ) is ??-closed for each closed subset, ? , of ?.10 The correspondence,
?(·? ·), is upper Caratheodory if it is product measurable in ? and ? and ??-?-upper
semicontinuous in ? for each ? (when no confusion is possible we will write upper semi-
continuous rather than ??-?-upper semicontinuous)?
Let ??? be the Borel ?-?eld in L?? generated by the weak star open (i.e., the ???-open)
subsets of L?? . A function
? : ? ?? L??
is (??? ???)-measurable (or just measurable) if for any Borel measurable subset E ????
of L?? ,
{? ? ? : ?(?) ? E} ? ??.
Similarly, a function
? : ? ?? ?
is (??? ??)-measurable (or just measurable) if for any Borel measurable subset ? of ?,
{? ? ? : ?(?) ? ?} ? ??.
5.3 USCOs
Consider the correspondence,
?(·) : L?? ?? ?? (?).
We say that a correspondence (or a set-valued mapping) ?(·) is an USCO if ?(·) is
upper semicontinuous (usc) with nonempty, compact values. Here, because ? is compact,
?(·) is an USCO if ?(·) is upper semicontinuous (usc) with ?(?) ? ?? (?) for all ? ? ??? .
We will denote by
U??-? := U(L?? ? ?? (?))
the set of all USCOs de?ned on L?? with values contained in ?? (?) (see Anguelov and
Kalenda, 2009, Crannell, Franz, and LeMasurier, 2005 and Hola and Holy, 2009). Note
10Equivalently, ?(?? ·) is ??-?-upper semicontinuous (usc) if given any open subset ? of ?, the set
?+? (?) :=
?
? ? L?? : ?(?? ?) ? ?
?
is ??-open in L?? .
24
also that because ? is compact, ?(·) is a USCO if and only if ???(·) is ?? × ?-closed
(i.e., ???(·) ? ?? (L?? ×?)).11 Note that if (?? ?) ?? ?(?? ?) is an upper Caratheodory
mapping, then for each ?, the mapping,
? ?? ??(?) := ?(?? ?)?
is an USCO.
Finally, we will denote by
U??-?? := U(L?? ? ???? (L?? ))
the collection of all USCOs,
?(·) : L?? ?? ???? (L?? ),
de?ned on L?? taking nonempty, ??-closed (and hence ??-compact) values in L?? .
Given an USCO, ?(·), we say that ?(·) is a sub-USCO belonging to ?(·) if ?(·) is an
USCO and the graph of ?(·), denoted by ???(·) is contained in the graph, ???(·), of the
USCO ?(·). Note that ?(·) is a sub-USCO of itself.
5.4 ??-??-USCOs
We say that a set-valued mapping (or a correspondence),
?(·) : L?? ?? ???? (L?? ),
is ??-??-upper semicontinuous if
??(? ) := {? ? L?? : ?(?) ? ? 6= ?}
is ??-closed for each ??-closed subset, ? , of L?? .12
We say that ?(·) is a ??-??-USCO if ?(·) is ??-??-upper semicontinuous (??-??-usc)
with nonempty, ??-compact values. Here, because L?? is ??-compact, ?(·) is an USCO
if ?(·) is ??-??-upper semicontinuous with
?(?) ? ???? (L?? ) for all ? ? L?? .
We will denote by
U??-?? := U(L?? ? ???? (L?? ))
the set of all ??-??-USCOs de?ned on L?? with values contained in ???? (L?? ). Note that
because L?? is ??-compact, ?(·) is a ??-??-USCO if and only if ???(·) is ??×??-closed.13
11???(?? ·) is closed if for any sequence {(??? ??)}? in ???(?? ·), ?? ???? ? and ?
? ?
??
? imply that
(?? ?) ? ???(?? ·).
12Equivalently, ?(·) is ??-??-upper semicontinuous (usc) if given any ??-open subset ? of L?? , the set
?+(?) :=
?
? ? L?? : ?(?? ?) ? ?
?
is ??-open in L?? .
13???(·) is ?? × ??-closed if for any sequence {(??? ??)}? in ???(·), ?? ???? ? and ?
? ?
???
? imply
that (?? ?) ? ???(·).
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5.5 Continuous Functions
A function ? : ??? ?? ? is said to be ??-?-continuous at ? ? ??? if for every ??-
open subset ? of ? such that ?(?) ? ? there is a ??-open set ?? containing ? such
that ?(??) ? ?. The function ? is ??-?-continuous if it is ??-?-continuous at every
? ? ??? .
A function ? : ??? ?? ??? is said to be ??-k·k1-continuous at ? ? ??? if for every
? ? 0 there is a ?? ? 0 such that for all ? ? ???? (??? ?) ? ??? , k?(?)? ?(?)k1 ? ?. The
function ? is ??-k·k1-continuous if it is ??-k·k1-continuous at every ? ? ??? .
Finally, a function ? : ??? ?? ??? is said to be ??-??-continuous at ? ? ??? if for
every ? ? 0 there is a ?? ? 0 such that for all ? ? ???? (??? ?) ? ??? , ???(?(?)? ?(?)) ? ?.
The function ? is ??-??-continuous if it is ??-??-continuous at every ? ? ??? .
We will denote by C??-? := C(L?? ??) the collection of all ??-?-continuous functions
de?ned on L?? with values in ?, by C??-k·k1 := C(L?? ?L?? ) the collection of all ??-k·k1-
continuous functions de?ned on L?? with values in L?? , and by C??-?? := C(L?? ?L?? ) the
collection of all ??-??-continuous functions de?ned on L?? with values in L?? .
Continuity Theorem A7.1.1 (Continuity of Players’ Payo? Pro?le Function)
Let ??? be a discounted stochastic game satisfying assumptions [DSG-1] with players’
payo? pro?le function,
(?? ?) ?? ?(?? ?? ?) := (?1(?? ?? ?1)? ? ? ? ? ??(?? ?? ??).
If {(??? ??)}? is a sequence in L?? ×? such that ?? ???? ?
? and ?? ??
??
??, then in
each state ? ? ?,
?(?? ??? ??) ??
??
?(?? ??? ??).
Proof. Let {(??? ??)}? be a sequence such that ?? ???? ?
? and ?? ??
??
??. Let ? be given
and ?xed, and observe that for each players ?:
|??(?? ??? ??? )? ??(?? ??? ???)|?
? |??(?? ??? ??? )? ??(?? ??? ??? )|?| {z }
??
+ |??(?? ??? ??? )? ??(?? ??? ???)|?| {z }
??
?
We will carry out our proof for one player ?, keeping in mind that the argument holds
for all players simultaneously. Consider ?? ?rst. We have
?? = ??
¯¯¯¯Z
?
??? (?0)?(?0|?? ??)?
Z
?
???(?0)?(?0|?? ??)
¯¯¯¯
?
?
Let ?(·|?? ??) be a density of ?(·|?? ??) with respect to ?. Given that ??? ?????
???, we have,R
? ?
?
? (?0)?(?0|?? ??) =
R
? ?
?
? (?0)?(?0|?? ??)??(?0)
?
R
? ?
?
?(?0)?(?0|?? ??)??(?0) =
R
? ?
?
?(?0)?(?0|?? ??)?
Thus, ?? ?? 0. Next, consider ??. We have
?? ? (1? ??)|??(?? ??)? ??(?? ??)|?| {z }
??1
+??
¯¯¯¯Z
?
??? (?0)?(?0|?? ??)?
Z
?
??? (?0)?(?0|?? ??)
¯¯¯¯
?| {z }
??2
?
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Continuity of ??(?? ·) and ?? ???? ?
? imply that ??1
??? 0. To see that ??2
??? 0,
observe that ¯¯R
? ?
?
? (?0)?(?0|?? ??)?
R
? ?
?
? (?0)?(?0|?? ??)
¯¯
?? k?(·|?? ??)? ?(·|?? ??)k? ?? 0?
Q.E.D.
6 Appendix 2: ?-Convergence
6.1 The Relevant Function Spaces
Let (?? ??? ?) be a probability space where ? is Polish (complete, separable, metric) and
? is a probability measure de?ned on the Borel ?-?eld ??.
We have
L?? ? L1?
and
L?? ? L??? ? L1?? .
We note that if a sequence, {??}?, in L?? converges in L1-norm to ?, then ? ? L?? - thus,
L?? is L1-norm closed in L??? (see Pales and Zeidan 1999). Recall that a sequence {??}?
in L??? ??-converges (or converges weak star) to ?? ? L??? if for each ?1 ? L1?? ,
?
??? ?1
®
:=
R
?
?
??(?)? ?1(?)
®
??(?) ??
??
R
?
?
??(?)? ?1(?)
®
??(?) :=
?
??? ?1
®
.
The space of value function pro?les, (L?? ? ???), is a compact, convex, metric space. We
will denote by ??
??
sequential convergence in L?? with respect to the metric ??? - and
therefore, convergence in L?? with respect to the ??-topology.
6.2 ?-Convergence
In this subsection we state the fundamental de?nitions and results we will need about
?-convergence.
6.2.1 ?-Convergence in L1??
Consider a sequence {??(·)}? ? ?1?? with corresponding sequence of arithmetic mean
functions,
©
1
?
P?
?=1 ??(·)
ª
?, and for any subsequence, {???(·)}?, of {??(·)}?, let the
corresponding subsequence of arithmetic mean functions be given by(
1
?
?X
?=1
???(·)
)
?
?
Finally, for each ?? let b??(·) := 1?P??=1 ??(·) and for each ?, let b???(·) := 1?P??=1 ???(·).
De?nition A7.2.1 (?-Sequences, ?-Convergence, and ?-Limits)
We say that a sequence {??}? ? ?1?? is ?-convergent (or is a ?-sequence) if there
exists a ?-limit function b? ? ?1?? such that,
(a) the corresponding sequence of arithmetic mean functions, {b??(·)}?, converges
pointwise a.e. [?] to b?(·), that is,
b??(?) ?? b?(?) a.e. [?],
27
and
(b) for any subsequence, {???(·)}?, of {??(·)}?, the corresponding subsequence of
arithmetic mean functions, {b???(·)}?, converges pointwise a.e. [?] to b?(·) as well, that
is, b???(?) ?? b?(?) a.e. [?].
We will often refer to set of ?-measure zero where pointwise arithmetic mean conver-
gence fails for a particular subsequence as the subsequence’s exceptional set.
A sequence, {??(·)}?, of functions in L1?? is norm-bounded provided
sup? k??k1 := sup?
P?
?=1 k??? k1 ??.
For the convenience of the reader we state the Theorem of Komlos (1967) as well as a
variation on Artstein’s Proposition C (1978) due to Page (1991).
Theorem A7.2.1 (Komlos Theorem, 1967):
If {??(·)}? ? L1?? is k·k1-bounded, then {??(·)}? has a ?-convergent subsequence.
Theorem A7.2.2 (Page’s Theorem, 1991):
If the sequence {??(·)}? ? L1?? is k·k1-bounded and K-converges to some integrable
??-valued function, b?(·), then
b?(?) ? ????{??(?)} a.e. [?]
and there exists an integrable ??-valued function, ??(·), such that ??(?) ? ??{??(?)}
a.e. [?] and Z
?
??(?)??(?) =
Z
?
b?(?)??(?).
We say that a set of functions, H ? L1?? , is ?-compact if every sequence, {??}? ? H,
has a ?-convergent subsequence with ?-limit contained in H. By Komlos’ Theorem
any k·k1-bounded subset H of L1?? is relatively ?-compact (i.e., has a ?-converging
subsequence with ?-limit contained in L1??).
6.2.2 ?-convergence and ??-Convergence in L???
Our next results concern the relationships between ?-convergence and weak star (??-
convergence) in L??? .
Theorem A7.2.3 (?-Convergence and ??-Convergence):
Suppose the primitives satisfy assumptions [DSG-1]. Let {??}? be any sequence in L??? .
Then the following statements are true:
(1) If {??}? ?-converges to b? ? ???? , then {??}? ? L??? ??-converges to b? ? L??? ?
(2) If {??}? ? L??? ??-converges to ?? ? L??? , then each ?-convergent subsequence of
{??}? has a ?-limit, b? ? ???? ? such that b? = ?? a.e. [?]?
Before proceeding to the proof, some comments on notation: In the statement of the
Theorem above, we write {??}? ? L??? , to indicate that rather than viewing the sequence
{??}? as a sequence of speci?c functions - which we will denote by {??}? ? ???? - we
are instead viewing the sequence as a sequence of ?-equivalence classes in L??? indexed
by the speci?c functions, ??. Thus, we write b? ? L??? to denote the ?-equivalence class
in L??? determined by the speci?c function, b?.
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PROOF: We will prove part (2) ?rst. Assume that {??}? ? L??? ??-converges to
?? ? L??? , and that the subsequence, {???}?, ?-converges to b? ? ???? . For each ? and
each ? ? ?1?? we have
1
?
?X
?=1
???(?)?(?) ?? b?(?)?(?) a.e. [?]
and by the Dominated Convergence Theorem also in L1??-norm. Thus, for each ? ? ?1?? ,R
? b?(?)?(?)??(?)
:= lim????
1
?
?X
?=1
R
? ?
??(?)?(?)??(?)
=
R
? ?
?(?)?(?)??(?)?
and hence b?(?) = ??(?) a.e. [?].
Now we will prove part (1). Assume that {??}? ? ???? ?-converges to some b? ? ???? .
In order to show that {??}? ??-converges to b?, by ??-compactness and metrizability, it
su?ces to show that the ?-equivalence class in L??? containing b? is the only limit point of
the sequence of ?-equivalence classes, {??}? ? L??? . Let ?? be any ??-limit point of the
sequence {??}? and let {???}? be a subsequence ??-converging to ??. By K-convergence
we know that this subsequence also K-converges to b? and hence by part (2) we know that
?? = b? a.e. [?]. Q.E.D.
7 Appendix 3: Metric Topology
7.1 Basics
Throughout assume that (?? ??) and (?? ??) are compact metric spaces.14 Because the
space ? is compact, for any collection {??}? of open sets in ? where ? = ???? and
? ranges over an arbitrary set ?, there exists a ?nite subcollection, ?1? ? ? ? ? ?? such that
? = ??1 ? · · · ???? (i.e., the Borel-Lebesgue condition - every open cover of ? contains
a ?nite subcover). The Borel-Lebesgue condition is equivalent to the Riesz condition:
if {??}? is a collection of closed sets in ? such that ???? = ?, then there is a ?nite
subcollection, ?1? ? ? ? ? ?? such that ??1 ? · · · ? ??? = ? (see Kuratowski, 1972).
Let C(???) denote the collection of continuous functions de?ned on ? taking values
in ?. If ? ? C(???) is one-to-one, from ? onto ?, and if its inverse, ??1, is also
continuous, then we say that ? is a homeomorphism and that the metric spaces ? and
? are homeomorphic. If (?? ??) is compact, then any continuous, one-to-one mapping
? from ? onto ? is a homeomorphism. A function, ? : ? ? ? is an embedding if
? : ? ? ?(?) is a homeomorphism. In this case we can think of ? as a topological
subspace of ? by identifying ? with its image ?(?)?
7.2 Continua
Given metric space (?? ??), a set ? ? ? is connected if ? cannot be written as the union
of two disjoint open sets (or two disjoint closed sets). A set ? ? ? is locally connected
14More detail on the topics covered in this Appendix can be found in Willard (1970) and Illanes and
Nadler (1999).
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at ? ? ? if each neighborhood ?? of ? contains a connected neighborhood ?? of ?. ? is
locally connected if it is locally connected at each ? ? ?.15
If the metric space, (?? ??), is compact and connected it is called a continuum. Given
any continuum, (?? ??), a point ? ? ? is called a cut point of ? if ?\{?} is not connected.
A nonempty closed, connected subset of ? is called a subcontinuum. If in addition, the
continuum, (?? ??), is locally connected it is called a Peano continuum.
A subset, ?, of metric space (?? ??) is called an ?-cell if it is homeomorphic to
?? :=
Q?
?=1[0? 1]? := [0? 1]?. If in particular, ? is homeomorphic to the interval [0? 1] it is
called an arc (i.e., an arc, then, is a 1-cell). An end point of arc ? is either one of the two
points of ? that are the images of the end points of [0? 1] under any homeomorphism of
[0? 1] onto ?. A continuum ? is arcwise connected if any two points, ?1 and ?2, in ? can
be joined by an arc in ? with endpoints ?1 and ?2.
We close this subsection by noting that in any metric space (?? ??) the condition of
being (i) a locally connected continuum (i.e., a Peano continuum) and (ii) the continuous
image of an interval are equivalent (this is the Mazurkiewicz-Moore Theorem - see Ku-
ratowski, 1972). Thus, a Peano continuum (with or without an M-convex metric) is the
continuous image of the unit interval, [0? 1].
7.3 Homotopies
We begin by recalling the notion of a homotopy - a function that essentially provides us
with a way to index a set of continuous functions.
De?nition A3.1 (Homotopies) Let ?(? × [0? 1]??) denote the collection of all
continuous functions, ? : ? × [0? 1] ?? ?, de?ned on ? × [0? 1] taking values in ?. A
function ? ? ?(? × [0? 1]??) is called a homotopy and each homotopy speci?es an index
set of continuous functions,
H?(???) := {?(·? ?) : ? ? [0? 1]} ?
The indexed collection, H?(???), can be thought of as an arc, ??, in the continuum of
continuous functions, C(???), equipped with the sup metric. The continuous functions,
? and ? in C(???) are homotopically related or homotopic, if ? and ? are the endpoints
of an arc ?? whose arc type is identi?ed by some function, ? ? C(? × [0? 1]??), called
a homotopy. In particular, if ?? ? ? C(???) are homotopic, then there is an arc of type
? ? C(?× [0? 1]??) running from continuous function ?(·) = ?(·? 0) to continuous function
?(·) = ?(·? 1). We denote this ?-arc from ? to ? by writing ? ? [? ]? or by writing ? ??? ?
(and if the orientation is in the opposite direction, then we write ? ? [?]? or ?
??? ?).
Constant functions form a special class of homotopy arc end points. Let ?? ? C(???)
denote the constant function (i.e., ??(?) = ? for all ? ? ?). If ? and ?? are homotopic (i.e.,
if ?? ? [? ]?, that is, if ?
??? ?? for some ? ? ?), then ? is said to be inessential. Moreover,
if for some pair of compact metric spaces, (?? ??) and (????), all pairs of functions, ?? ? ?
15Local connectedness di?ers from connectedness. To see this, note for example that the set ? in ?
given by
? = [0? 1) ? (1? 2]
is locally connected but not connected (because ? is equal to the union of two disjoint, half open intervals).
While the set ? in ?2 given by
? := {(?? 0)? (?? 1
?
) : 0 ? ? ? 1 and ? = ±1?±2? ? ? ?} ? {(0? ?)? (1? ?) : ? ? ?}
is connected but not locally connected (because only the point (0? 0) and (1? 0) in ? possess a collection
of connected neighborhoods). These examples are taken from Willard (1970), Chapter 8.
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C(???), are homotopic, then in particular, ?? ?? ? C(???), are homotopic for some ?-arc
and some ? ? ? - and this means that for this pair of compact metric spaces, (?? ??) and
(?? ??), all functions , ? ? C(???), are inessential (i.e., for each ? ? C(???), there is
(?(·? ·)? ?) ? (C(? × [0? 1]??)??), ? ??? ??).
7.4 ??-Spaces and ???-Spaces
A space ? is an absolute retract, denoted ? ? ??, if whenever ? is embedded in some
a metric space, say ?, then the embedded copy, ?(?), of ? in ? - with homeomorphism
? : ? ? ?(?) ? ?, is a retract of ?. A space ? is an absolute neighborhood retract,
denoted ? ? ???, if whenever ? is embedded in some a metric space, say ?, then the
embedded copy, ?(?), of ? in ? - with homeomorphism ? : ? ? ?(?) ? ?, is a retract
of some neighborhood of ?(?) in ?.
7.5 Contractible Spaces
If ? ? ?, then ? is contractible in ? if for some homotopy ? ? C(? × [0? 1]??), there is
an ?-arc running from the identity (or inclusion) mapping, ??? ? C(???) to a constant
mapping, ?? ? C(???), for some ? ? ?. Thus, ???(·) = ?(·? 0) where ???(?) = ? for all
? ? ? is the inclusion mapping (i.e., ???(?) = ? = ?(?? 0) for all ? ? ?) and ?(·? 1) is the
constant mapping (i.e., ?(?? 1) = ? for all ? ? ? for some ? ? ?).
We say that ? is contractible if ? is contractible in ?. Note that if ? is contractible,
then for any ? ? ?, ? is contractible in ?. By far the most useful facts related to the
contractibility of continua are the following:
(1) If ? is contractible and ? ? ? is a retraction of ?, then ? is also contractible.
Thus if ? : ? onto?? ?, ? ? C(???) where ?(?) = ? for all ? ? ?, then ? is also contractible.
(2) If ? is contractible, then ? is unicoherent (see Corollary A.12.10 in van Mill, 2001)
- implying that all pairs of functions, ?? ? ? C(???1), are homotopic, for the unit circle,
?1 :=
n
? = (?1? ?2) : (?1)2 + (?2)2 = 1
o
. Thus, if ? is contractible, then all continuous
functions, ? : ? ? ?1 are inessential and we can conclude that ? contains no simple
closed curves.
7.6 ??-Spaces
A space ? is called an ??-space, denoted ? ? ??, if there exists a sequence of compact,
nonempty AR spaces, {??}? such that
??+1 ? ?? for every ?
and
? = ???=1???
If ? is compact, then we have the following inclusion ordering over the topological prop-
erties of ?:
?? ? contractible ? ??.
Note that if ? is an ?? space, it is an ??? space.
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